Galileo: European Collaboration for Space by Maddens Toscano, Pedro
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2016 Article 4
9-22-2016
Galileo: European Collaboration for Space
Pedro Maddens Toscano
Georgia Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more
information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maddens Toscano, Pedro (2016) "Galileo: European Collaboration for Space," Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on
the European Union: Vol. 2016, Article 4. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201601.04
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/4
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 2 5
3
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Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract
This paper examines the Galileo satellite navigation system as an example of European 
collaboration, and illustrates how the project has put Europe and European industry at the 
forefront of the space industry. It discusses the history of the program as well as its technical 
and financial aspects. The collaboration efforts are discussed highlighting the nature of the 
political, economic and technological forms of both intergovernmental and supranational 
cooperation. In addition to the Galileo system, the paper also includes a brief discussion on 
the Global System for Mobile Communications, one of the greatest successes of European 
technical collaboration. 
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Introduction
In a recent New York Times article titled Europe the Unready, Paul Krugman states that 
“European unity has suffered setbacks” but that “ideally, Europe would respond to these 
setbacks by strengthening its union, creating more of the institutions it needs to manage 
interdependence” (Krugman, 2015). Today, some even go so far as to question the whole 
concept of a Union, and others seem to want the European Union to disintegrate. Col-
laboration at various levels has been key to maintaining unity, peace and prosperity, and 
remains at the core of the Union. Since the beginning of what was essentially an economic 
project albeit with a political end- peace - what helped the European Union develop into 
a political union has been collaboration, especially industrial collaboration, and many suc-
cesses have emerged, including in the telecommunications, space and aviation industries. 
Major programs such as Galileo could not have been launched as national programs. But 
their success has depended on strong political will of European partners as well as on buy-in 
from industry. This collaboration and cooperation at various levels has created the tools and 
framework necessary for the success of these programs and projects.
This paper offers a brief analysis of one of the key European collaboration efforts in 
the space sector - the Galileo satellite navigation system - and compares this project to one 
of the most successful cases of collaboration in the telecommunications sector - the Global 
Standard for Mobile Communications (GSM) - where cooperation and collaboration be-
tween European governments, industry, and standard setting bodies under the guidance and 
leadership of the European Commission helped to establish the GSM project as a global 
standard for the communications sector in Europe and around the world.
Galileo
According to the European Commission, the European Union’s executive body that 
represents the interests of the European Union as a whole, “6-7% of European Global 
Domestic Product – representing a value of around 800 billion Euro– is already dependent 
on satellite navigation” (European Space Agency [ESA], 2014). This has had an important 
impact on the European economy, both in terms of opportunities for the space, defence, 
and aviation industries, as well as in terms of the ripple effects of the space industry and its 
developments on other industries and sectors – transport, health, education, and electricity 
to name but a few. The market for satellite navigation services alone is expected to be worth 
EUR 250 billion per year by 2022, and estimates indicate that Galileo could contribute 
EUR 90 billion to the European economy over the first 20 years of operations (European 
Commission, 2016).
For many years, the American Air Force satellite navigation system – the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) - dominated the satellite navigation market. The GPS system has both 
military and civilian purposes. Since the 1990s, for a variety of reasons, including the protec-
tion and promotion of national and European defence and industrial policy and industries, 
European politicians and industry have realized the need to create less dependence on GPS 
and indeed to develop their own system. They believed that this could protect European 
defence interests while also promoting industrial policy and increasing the competitive-
ness of a key industry for Europe. In addition to independence from GPS, the system was 
also created to be a civilian system, with the aim of creating jobs and other economic op-
portunities across Europe. The main concerns that the United States had with the Galileo 
satellite navigation system were security and commercial issues, i.e. the US saw Galileo as 
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competition. However, an agreement was reached in 2004 which acknowledged that Gali-
leo is complimentary to GPS and created collaboration efforts within Europe and between 
Europe and the United States. Indeed, this agreement built on already existing strong co-
operation efforts in the space sector between the European Union and the United States. 
The Russian Government also owns a satellite navigation system, Globalnaya Navigazion-
naya Sputnikovaya Sistema or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), which was 
created during the former Soviet Union regime, with the first satellite set in orbit in 1982. 
When the Soviet Union fell, significant budgetary cuts affected the GLONASS project, and 
it was not until 2001 that the GLONASS constellation started to be modernized. In 2007, 
Russia announced that it would finish GLONASS and make it available to customers. Like 
GPS, this system is a military system. Competing with GPS and GLONASS, both military-
run programs, has been a challenge for Galileo. 
A 1999 European Commission Communication listed three reasons why a European 
satellite navigation system had become essential. This positioning was also confirmed in a 
2015 Paper entitled Europe Must Succeed in the Global Navigation Market Race, where Galileo 
Services stated that there was a real need for “a coordinated industrial policy to support the 
European economy and to contribute to the competitiveness of European enterprises. It 
addresses the specific case of the European industry of applications and services based on sat-
ellite positioning, navigation and timing - the European Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) downstream industry” (Galileo Services, 2015).
The first European satellite navigation system - the European Geostationary Naviga-
tion Overlay Service (EGNOS) - and precursor to Galileo, consists of three geostationary 
satellites and a network of ground stations. EGNOS still uses the American GPS satellite 
navigation system and is used for safety critical applications including aviation and ship-
ping. EGNOS is a first example of collaboration in this field, joining the European Space 
Agency (ESA), the European Commission, and the European Organisation for the Safety 
of Air Navigation in a first phase for the development of the system. After the first phase, 
ownership and management of EGNOS was transferred to the European Commission on 1 
April 2009. Operations are defined through a contract with the European Satellite Services 
Provider, an operator based in France (ESA, 2013). Air Traffic management agencies from 
a plethora of different European countries were key players in EGNOS by contributing to 
the Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems funding.
 Although the EGNOS uses the GPS satellite navigation system for safety critical ap-
plications, including aviation, the aim of creating Galileo was to have an even more precise 
and European-led project. 
The first European Commission Communication specifically on Galileo was published 
in 1999 and was entitled Involving Europe in a New Generation of Satellite Navigation Services. 
The Communication specifically recognized that even though the United States already 
had a head start in developing global navigation systems, Europe had much at stake and 
therefore needed to make a decision quickly on its stand in terms of developing a next gen-
eration of positioning, navigation, and timing systems (European Commission [EC], 1999). 
Several Member States did not want to share their industrial power or had a fear of a lack 
of political will for the project. Different member states also wanted different objectives for 
the program, i.e. France wanted a large military use, whereas the United Kingdom did not. 
However, although the European Commission illustrated the political will to support the 
project, including the fact that it created the Galileo Task Force and launched the Galileo 
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Overall Architecture Definition Project to define what the Galileo project would achieve, 
some Member States were reluctant to join in the efforts. The Treaty of Lisbon strength-
ened the space policy in the European Union by allowing the European Union to conduct 
a Space Policy, which it was not authorised to conduct before. It also required the European 
Union to create relations with the European Space Agency.
The Galileo program “was financed jointly with ESA in the first stages, its full deploy-
ment has been financed with European Union budget funds. The European Commission, 
as the executive arm of the European Union, is the program manager. As any other under-
takings of the European Union, the EU Member States are the ultimate stakeholders of the 
program and play a major role in the decision-making process” (Bartolomé et al., 2015, p 
10). Part of the reason for its survival was that although the project was initially designed 
as a partnership between the public and public sectors, meaning that its cost and revenue 
would be shared, support from France and Germany in particular allowed for its trans-
formation into a new financial structure. The initial phase, meaning the definition phase, 
development, and In-Orbit Validation phase of the Galileo program were carried out by 
ESA and co-funded by ESA and the European Union. However, this structure could not 
be continued due to the perceived risk and cost of the project by key stakeholders. China 
became involved in 2003, and even funded the project. However, after being shut out of 
the decision making bodies and Chinese companies not being awarded projects, the partner-
ship was halted. In 2007, sceptics thought the project would not be realized and an article in 
The Economist even stated that Galileo was “a political creation founded on national vanities 
rather than commercial logic” (The Economist, 2007). In 2007, the Public Private Partner-
ship (PPP) scheme for Galileo funding failed, and this could have been the end of Galileo.
Despite its challenges, though, the project continued, with European Funds being lev-
eraged for the project – again an example of political will as well as leadership from the Eu-
ropean Commission and the realization that it was a priority to pursue the project. Although 
at first the financial actors (which includes European nations as well as private industry and 
China) were not able to agree and the European Union Transport Commissioner Jacques 
Barrot personally even stopped the PPP, the European Union Transport Council at its ses-
sion of 29 and 30 November 2007 decided to support the future developments of Galileo. 
Indeed, the Transport Council did not terminate the project, but rather “endorsed a fully 
public funding scheme for the construction and deployment of the funding modalities” 
(Nardon, 2007). The Transport Council also gave the European Union funding authority. 
This decision together with the European Union Economic and Finance Ministers Council 
and European Parliament decision of 23 November 2007 on the financing of the program 
gave the European Commission the basis to implement the next phase of the European 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems program by providing that the next phase would be 
carried out and financed by the European Union (EC, 2007). 
Since then, the political will for this project, and for some kind of collaboration be-
tween the European Union, the European Space Agency, and the Member States has re-
emerged in part due to a changing world order, where dependence on non-European space 
infrastructure is not perceived as optimal to the future development of Europe. Having an 
independent, civilian European global positioning system, which could be used for both 
military and civilian purposes creates less dependence on other countries and regions and 
is key to European autonomy and its economic and industrial development. Today, there 
are numerous examples across the sectors where precise information is key for effective 
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operation. Satellite navigation systems provide key positioning and other types of informa-
tion which are essential for the effective operation of, for example, smart grids, oil fields, 
telecommunication networks, transportation networks, and banking networks. 
Today, the Full Operational Capability phase of the Galileo program is completely 
funded by the European Union as seen in the Draft General Budget of the European Union 
for the Financial Year of 2016 and managed by the European Commission. The European 
Union plans to spend about 7 billion Euro to get Galileo to Full Operational Capability 
by 2020 (European Union, 2015). As seen in many other European Union decisions, the 
true motor of the Galileo project has been the Franco- German partnership (many of the 
contracts were given to French or German entities), with the French Space Agency; Centre 
National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), and the German Space Agency; Deutsches Zentrum für 
Luft-und Raumfahrt (DLR) doing a substantial amount of research.
Galileo will be comprised of 30 satellites in Middle Earth Orbit (which is at about 
23,000 kilometers above the Earth’s surface). These satellites have an inclination of 56 
degrees (European GNSS Service Centre, 2015) and there will be three orbits with two 
redundant satellites in each. The first satellite for Galileo was launched in 2005. This satel-
lite, GIOVE-A was meant to prove the technology. The first In-Orbit Validation (IOV) 
satellites were launched in 2011 to prove that the ground segment works and that the system 
meets all the requirements. After the four IOV phase satellites proved that the technology 
was a success, eight more satellites have been launched and the system is now progressing 
towards Full Operational Capability (FOC). There are currently 12 satellites in orbit, with 
the last two being launched in December 2015. Galileo will be able to provide initial op-
erational compatibility by the end of 2016 and FOC is scheduled for 2020 (EC, 2016). A 
further launch is scheduled to be in May 2016 from French Guiana, with four more sched-
uled to be launched by December 2016. 
Satellites also need to have a ground segment to be able to communicate with the 
Earth. Today, there are two main Control Centers, the Fucino Control Center in Italy and 
the Oberpfaffenhofen Control Center in Germany, which control the satellites and the mis-
sion. The site in Italy primarily manages the data whereas the site in Germany controls the 
satellites. These control centers are also redundant for each other (i.e. they can take on the 
other’s responsibilities in case of need). There are many other Sensor Stations that manage 
different tasks such as sending navigation instructions, tracking, and connecting the ground 
stations. The full infrastructure is as follows and is additionally shown in Figure 1:
•	 “16 sensor stations;
•	 2 control centres;
•	 5 mission uplink stations;
•	 5 telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) stations;
•	 4 service facilities: the Galileo service centre, the Galileo reference cen-
tre, the Search and Rescue data service provider, and the Galileo secu-
rity monitoring centre” (EC, 2016).
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Figure 1: Full Infrastructure of the Galileo Navigation System (EC, 2016)
An important fact about Galileo is that it is complementary to GPS, meaning that 
both systems can be used together. According to a 1999 European Commission publication 
entitled Involving Europe in a New Generation of Satellite Navigation Services, “Galileo gives 
Europe clear opportunities for strengthening political ties with other countries” (EC, 1999). 
This publication also rejects the zero option which is Europe’s withdrawal from having a 
role in Global Navigation Satellite System. 
The fact that the European Union only recently got involved in the European space 
sector and the strong political will to make Europe a world space power comparable to the 
United States and Russia as well as the new space powers (i.e. China and India) makes the 
need for the success of the Galileo satellite system crucial. With guaranteed funding until 
2020, and recent progress in launches, this project could be the next success story of Euro-
pean collaboration. However, a major problem of Galileo still seems to be its competitive 
viability and its profit capacity versus GPS. In the first years, the United States challenged 
the need for the program and was concerned about possible non-civil uses of the system. 
Today there is still political support as illustrated by the incorporation of the project in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, the Horizon 2020 program, as well as European space industry’s 
competitiveness at the global level. 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/4
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 3 1
Another Example of European Collaboration
In the late 1980s, liberalisation in the telecommunications sector was starting around 
the world, presenting governments and society with a great challenge, and many oppor-
tunities. Times were changing at economic, political and social levels and the European 
Commission and key Member States were realizing that there were long-term economic 
goals in Europe that had to be addressed, including in the telecommunications sector. The 
Conference des Administrations Europeans des Posts et Telecommunications (CEPT) also saw that 
it needed to address specific sector needs. In Europe, although many of its member states 
still had state monopolies for telecommunications, with national interests dominating their 
respective agendas, they were also aware that in order to develop and benefit from an in-
dustry that was showing economic promise, significant levels of pan-European co-operation 
were becoming essential, if only to provide economies of scale for new business models. 
And yet, differences in relation to cellular technology standards still existed inside CEPT, 
and negotiations were difficult. 
The process of making a unified European mobile standard was not easy since stan-
dards were scattered – even across the Union – and commercial interests, security, and 
political interests intervened in the quest for harmonization. Like many EU developments, 
the central core of political and economic power consisted of French and German coopera-
tion, and here too the insights and political willingness to succeed and move forward proved 
to be key to the success of GSM. In 1984, France and Germany signed a joint develop-
ment agreement for GSM (GSMA, 2016). Both governments saw a need for Europe-wide 
regulation and, working together with the European Commission, who wanted to bring in 
funding and support and threw their political support behind the process with the adoption 
of the Frequency Directive for the 900 MHz Band, and with other member states, they led 
the effort to lobby the mobile industry in each member country of the European Union to 
convince them of what they essentially saw not only as an economic opportunity, but also 
as a political opportunity for European industry. 
Politicians and stakeholders realized that by harmonizing communications standards at 
European level, more than just a technical standard would be achieved. It would also con-
tribute to the freedom of movement of people, goods, and services – one of the core items 
on the agenda of Jacques Delors who had become President of the European Commission 
in 1985. This created momentum with European mobile industry players who, realizing the 
economic benefits of a harmonized European and even of a global standard, started putting 
their weight behind the call for and development of this harmonized standard. Governments 
supported industry and France, Germany, and the Nordic countries in particular were cen-
tral to the process. The European Commission also saw the opportunity and threw their 
weight behind the work of governments, industry, and standards setting body. At first there 
was some resistance as CEPT saw no need for Commission support or interference. But the 
momentum could not be stopped and political, technical and economic support was needed 
at all levels. 
What also helped was political momentum – politically the European Commission 
was empowered – Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission from 1985 to 
1995 and he was looking to achieve the further success and unity of the European Union. 
Although CEPT did not see the need for the European Commission to intervene in GSM, 
through its work in the World Radio Communications Conferences (WRCs) and the 
adoption in 1987 of the GSM Directive that reserved part of the 900MHz spectrum band 
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for GSM technologies like mobile phones, the role of the Commission was recognized, 
and made significant contributions to the process, both at standards, political, regulatory 
and promotional level. One of the most important documents produced by the European 
Commission was a Green Paper, in 1987, on the development of the common market 
for telecommunications services and equipment. This Green Paper emphasized the impor-
tance of a “technically advanced, Europe-wide, low-cost telecommunications network” 
(European Union, 1987) for a competitive European economy. The Green Paper suggested 
European competition in the areas of network equipment, terminals, and communication 
services. With this Green Paper, industry had finally achieved the political support it needed 
to advance its objectives. In 1998, another European Union Green Paper was written – the 
Green Paper on Convergence – that started a debate on the implications of the convergence 
of the telecommunications, media and information technologies sectors. The success of 
the Green paper, and its related discussions and decisions can be attributed to the success 
of GSM since the European Commission was able to use its authority and employed t to 
further liberalise the telecommunications market as a whole in the next years – a process 
started in 1987, with full liberalisation by 1998. This led to the digital mobile telephony 
boom in Europe and around the world. This standard is an example of swift and effective 
European Union cohesion and collaboration, not only between countries, but also between 
politicians, industry and consumer interests.
Conclusion
Today, there are multiple crises within the European Union. Some even threaten to 
tear the Union apart, which has kept peace for over six decades.
As seen by the GSM story - a past example of European collaboration, when EU 
member states work together - great technological progress has been made in Europe, and 
the projects have also had a global impact. The collaboration to create GSM led to what is 
today one of the most (if not the most) important communications standard. Although the 
Galileo satellite navigation system is not yet completely developed, it has also shown signs 
of just how important it will be in the future. And its development is also due to the fact 
that it is a pan- European project that has benefitted from collaboration between institutions 
and countries. Galileo’s strength comes from the fact that it “seems to be in line with the 
story of EU integration since the 1950s” (Nardon, 2007). It is also a strong program because 
the European Commission supports it. As Paul Krugman said, the Union has had its chal-
lenges but that “ideally, Europe would respond to these setbacks by strengthening its union” 
(Krugman, 2015). The Galileo project has the potential to be the next great European suc-
cess. However, if it fails, a great opportunity will be lost, and the window of opportunity for 
European industry to benefit from the current GNSS market boom will be closed. Harness-
ing technological advances has more often than not strengthened the Union, and in a time 
where nationalistic parties are growing and advocating for the end of Schengen, the Euro 
or even the whole Union, these advances will foster solidarity, create job opportunities and 
can thus lead to stronger integration, and ultimately to hope for a better life and continued 
peace for its citizens. 
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